HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL DISABILITY CASE SUMMARIES IN MAY & JUNE 2024
The following are a summary of recent decisions relating to disability and human rights from the human rights tribunals in Canada (Summer, 2024, Issue 1).
This issue of our digest covers a selection of decisions from the Human Rights Tribunals of Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador, and the Northwest Territories during the months of May and June, 2024.
This information is not intended to provide legal advice.
Prepared by Research Assistants for the Law, Disability & Social Change Project: Dawn Hadwen (JD Candidate, 2025) and Simran Toor (Dual JD Candidate, 2026).
May 2024
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal
Applicant v Lambton Kent District School Board, 2024 HRTO 777 (CanLII)
Date Issued: May 31, 2024
This was an application brought by the applicant, a high school student with a learning disability. Represented by their litigation guardian, the applicant alleges that the respondent acted contrary to subsection 45.9(3) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19, (the “Code”), by failing to adhere to the terms of a settlement agreement that was agreed upon after the applicant brought an application alleging discrimination based on disability in 2020, when they were enrolled in Demonstration School’s High Intensity Academic Intervention Program for students with learning disabilities.
The complaint from 2020 was resolved through mediation, with an agreement that the School Board would conduct meetings to facilitate the applicant’s transition back to school. Meetings scheduled for August/September 2022, proceeded as planned, but those scheduled for January/February 2023 were not carried out as agreed upon. Evidence submitted by the applicant maintained that the school administrators’ efforts to implement accommodations were not consistent and led to heightened anxiety, low grades, and lack of enthusiasm for school. The applicant’s litigation guardian emailed the System Coordinator of Special Education, concerning the applicant’s academic challenges. Upon discovering the Coordinator had retired, they subsequently forwarded their concerns to the new Coordinator, who established a plan to move forward. The respondent claimed that meetings were discontinued because the litigation guardian requested their cancellation, indicating she would “be in touch if the applicant needed any more support.”
By applying principles of contract law – specifically by analyzing the parties’ intentions, which in this case were to assist the applicant with their transition back to school – the Tribunal found that the School Board had contravened the settlement agreement. The Tribunal accepted that the School Board’s obligations were not waived, and that the respondent had the responsibility to verify that the applicant no longer required further meetings. Additionally, the Tribunal found that it was not suitable to grant compensation for breach of settlement. Their reasoning was that remedies available under subsection 45.9(8) are inherently linked to the harm caused by the contravention of a settlement. The Tribunal described the respondent’s contravention as minor, inadvertent, and easily remedied, relying on further evidence that the applicant’s academic standing had improved since the scheduled 2023 meetings. Consequently, due to a lack of corroborating evidence to support the assertions made by the applicant regarding emotional distress, and subsequent tutoring expenses, the Tribunal decided it would not be appropriate to compensate the applicant. Furthermore, the Tribunal noted paragraph four of the settlement minutes, which stated that the litigation guardian had the opportunity to arrange a meeting with the Board at any time, a step she did not take. The Tribunal found that any harms presented were caused by the schoolteachers’ failure to provide consistent in-class accommodations, rather than the School Board’s failure to schedule the January and February 2023 meetings. For these reasons, certain terms of the agreement remained in effect, including paragraph four, that stipulated the legal guardian may make a request for a school-based team meeting to be scheduled with the Board.
British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal
Complainant v Kelowna Actors Studio Inc, 2024 BCHRT 136 (CanLII)
Date Issued: May 2, 2024
A complaint was filed with the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal claiming that the respondent discriminated against the complainant on the grounds of disability, with respect to employment, contrary to s. 13(1) of the Human Rights Code (“Code”). The complainant has a neurodivergent condition and was a minor at the time of filing. In this case, the Tribunal did not hold a hearing as a settlement was reached between the complainant and respondent in which both parties agreed to all terms to resolve all issues relating to the complainant’s filing. The parties then requested the Tribunal enter the facts and remedies into a Consent Order.
Based on the Consent Order, the complainant was a teenage actor hired to play the lead role in a musical, that he had previously portrayed twice before. The complainant had been diagnosed with neurodivergent conditions and a few days after his first rehearsal for the musical, the respondent sent email correspondence to terminate the complainant’s employment. The respondent acknowledges and understands that they did not meet their legal requirement to accommodate the complainant’s disabilities prior to terminating his employment, resulting in severe impacts to his mental health and desire to partake in future performances, and attend school.
The parties agreed to lift the anonymization order made earlier in 2020 in order to publish the Consent Order. The respondent agreed to cease and further refrain from committing the same or similar contravention of s.13(1) of the Code, along with agreeing to enforce practices such as sensitivity training and educational programs, implement a policy for persons with neurodivergent disorders, and adopt an employment equity program to ameliorate conditions of persons with disabilities and accommodate them in theatre. Moreover, the respondent was ordered to pay the complainant for the following: lost wages amounting to $1,200, injury to the complainant’s dignity, feelings, and self-respect for $35,000, and $18,998 for expenses incurred due to discrimination including therapeutic counselling sessions, medical expenses, and expenses for expert assessments and opinions for legal proceedings. In addition to these payments, interest may be applicable if they were not paid in full and in accordance with the Court Order Interest Act.
Overall, the Tribunal declared that under s.37(2)(b) of the Code, the conduct of the respondent was discriminatory and contrary to s.13(1). The Tribunal also ordered that the remedies of the Consent Order be provided by the respondent within 120 days of the decision date.
Alberta Human Rights Commission
Complainant v Millcreek Court Condominium Corp, 2024 AHRC 87 (CanLII)
Date Issued: May 31, 2024
In this case, the complainant, who is a resident of the respondent’s condominium building and identifies with having a physical disability, requested that the respondent, who is responsible for the management of the residential units and common property of the condominium, install a railing on the outside stairs of her unit and arrange for snow removal during winter months. The respondent arranged for snow removal in late 2021 at their own expense and agreed to facilitate the installation of the railing without paying for any costs. The complainant asserts that by failing to clear the snow until late 2021 and by refusing to fund the installation of the railing, the respondent discriminated against her on the grounds of physical disability, contrary to s.4 of the Alberta Human Rights Act (“Act”).
The respondent claims that the complainant filed for the snow removal outside of the time limitation found under s.20(2)(b) of the Act, making the complaint time-barred. Both parties provide a different timeline of events for when the complaint was made. The respondent asserts that the complaint was first brought to their attention in early spring of 2019, while the complainant states that she made the first request for snow removal in early 2020. When the complainant made the initial request, the property manager informed her that additional clearance would not be provided unless all property owners agreed and took responsibility for the additional costs. Considering both timelines, the Tribunal decided that the complainant’s timeline was more accurate.
The Tribunal also found that the respondent had reasonably accommodated the complainant’s request for snow removal, as they had installed concrete pads along the front of the parking area connecting to the sidewalk, at their own expense. Moreover, the Tribunal determined that the delay by the respondent in implementing the accommodation did not amount to a total failure to accommodate the complainant. As for the installation of the railing on the stairs outside the unit, the respondent argued that they were not required to perform the duty requested as the front steps of the unit were not common property, meaning the stairs were not readily available for the use of everyone in the condominium or the public. The respondent argued that installing the railing was therefore the responsibility of the complainant, and that providing permission for the installation was accommodating on its own. Conversely, the complainant asserted that she was only responsible for the interior of her unit and not the exterior features, as per s.2.1(c) of the condominium Bylaws. To counter, the respondent claimed that the complainant had the “right to exclude” others from the stairs, which would indicate that the complainant had exclusive possession of the stairs outside the unit. However, the Tribunal determined that this exclusivity was not given to the complainant. Overall, the Tribunal recognized that the front stairs were available to the public and thus the responsibility of the respondent to maintain. The failure to provide the requested accommodation to the complainant was, therefore, discriminatory.
The respondent contended that they did not provide installation of the railing as it would cause undue financial hardship. The respondent has access to a “reserve fund” into which all owners contribute money to fund major repairs and replacements, however they did not utilize these monies for the railing. The Tribunal found that the respondent’s decision to not draw from available finances within the reserve fund, was rational and fiscally responsible. Additionally, the Tribunal concluded that the Condominium Board’s decision to not install the railing was made in good faith. However, ultimately the respondent’s argument failed as they provided no information about their financial circumstances or their ability to bear the cost of installing the railing, demonstrating that the expense was not unreasonable. The Tribunal also explained that a respondent must expect some form of expense for providing accommodations. In conclusion, the Tribunal found that the respondent had not justified their failure to install the railing under s.11 of the Act.
Following their decision that the respondent discriminated against the complainant based on her physical disability, the Tribunal ordered the complainant to pay general damages amounting to $20,000 for injury to her dignity. Along with that, the respondent was ordered to pay judgment interest on the $20,000 in accordance with the Judgment Interest Act, and install the railing on the front steps of the complainant’s unit at their own expense, or reimburse the complainant for the railing and installation. No other significant costs were awarded to the complainant as the respondent did not partake in dishonest conduct in the proceedings, nor act prejudicially to another party or the integrity of the process.
Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Commission
Complainant v Astaldi Canada Inc, 2024 CanLII 40945 (NL HRC)
Date Issued: May 8, 2024
The complainant filed an application that his employer, the respondent, failed to accommodate his disability, thus constituting discrimination on the grounds of disability under s.14 of the Human Rights Act, 2010. The complainant was a bus driver, water truck operator, and performed other driving duties that were required at the employment site. The complainant took a leave of absence to treat his substance use disorder, and attended addictions treatment. As a result, the complainant lost access to the work site and the respondent informed him that once he completed his treatment and returned to work, he would need to request access again and go through an appeals process. A year later, the complainant was approved to return to work and completed all required procedures to regain access to the site. Approximately a month later, the respondent informed the complainant that there was no position available for him due to a shortage of work.
The complainant claims that he was placed on administrative leave immediately after disclosing that he had a substance use disorder, which was also when Muskrat Falls Corporation (who was not named in the original complaint) revoked his site access. The complainant explained that he felt as if he was being “thrown aside” when he was given leave. Conversely, the respondent states that the complainant was required to write an apology letter to the Muskrat Falls Site Access Review Committee and fulfill other requirements, such as the appeals process, prior to regaining access to the site and being hired back.
The witness for the complainant was unable to speak about why the complainant was not hired back after being promised that he could return. As for the witness for the respondent, he informed the Tribunal that the hiring process required the respondent to inform Muskrat Falls about the complainant’s substance use disorder; it was then Muskrat Falls who was responsible for revoking the complainant’s site access. Additionally, the witness identified that no one could guarantee employment upon the complainant’s return, but also that if there was a position available, then he would have been hired back. As for the respondent’s duty to accommodate, the respondent’s witness argues that there is no duty to accommodate a substance use disorder and rather that it is only a requirement for an injury.
A conversation between representatives of both parties, showed that union representatives had assured the complainant that he would be able to return to work after completing treatment and fulfilling additional requirements imposed by Muskrat Falls. The respondent accepts that they did not make any referral to the union hiring hall for rehire and rather issued a layoff due to a shortage of work. The Tribunal found that the comments of assurance for employment were made by the union representatives and therefore cannot be held against the respondent.
Further, the Tribunal found through submissions of the Commission’s Counsel, that substance use disorder is a disability that requires the duty to accommodate, which the respondent took no steps towards due to his belief that no such duty existed. Intent to accommodate is not sufficient under human rights law, what matters is the actual accommodation. The complainant seeks general damages and compensation for lost wages for the time between his regaining access to the site until he was rehired. As a result, the Tribunal found that the complainant was entitled to compensation in general damages amounting to $4,000, and lost income for the short period between May 28th, 2017, to August 31st, 2017, valued at $38,750, as after that timeframe, the complainant would have been laid off due to a shortage of work regardless.
June 2024
Ontario Human Rights Tribunal
Applicant v York Entrepreneurship Development Institute, 2024 HRTO 800 (CanLII)
Date Issued: June 5, 2024
The applicant alleges that during an employment interview with the respondent, they were subject to discrimination based on disability, race, colour, and gender identity, contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O 1990 c.H 19, as amended (the “Code”), and that the respondent failed to investigate these allegations after the applicant raised them.
The applicant applied to a mentorship program for local entrepreneurs, administered by the respondent, York Entrepreneurship Development Institute. Prior to the interview process the applicant did not disclose their disability or request an accommodation. Following the interview process, the applicant emailed the respondent to express concerns as to the panelists’ patriarchal attitude during the interview, the lack of accommodation mechanisms for people with disabilities, and alleged that the panelists did not provide equitable access to her “as a BIPOC woman with disability challenges.” The Director of Operations maintained that the applicant’s feedback would be implemented into future interview processes and informed the applicant that the process was designed to be free of bias, fair and equal for all applicants.
The Tribunal noted that the duty to accommodate is triggered only when an applicant discloses a need for a disability accommodation and that there was no support in law stating that the respondent had an obligation to publicize information on their website about accommodations. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant sincerely believed she was discriminated against but found there was insufficient corroborating evidence of same. The applicant must have presented a basis beyond speculation to show that the Code was breached. The request for the Tribunal to infer that the interviewers harboured discriminatory assumptions about black women therefore had no reasonable prospect of success. As for the applicant’s submission, that the respondent neglected its duty to investigate the human rights complaint, the Code does not impose an obligation on the respondent to investigate. The Tribunal found that correspondence between the parties reflected that the Director of Operations raised the applicant’s concerns with the interview panel members. For these reasons, the Tribunal decided that the application had no reasonable prospect of success and the application was dismissed.
Applicant v Canada Games Council, 2024 HRTO 810 (CanLII)
Date Issued: June 7, 2024
This application was filed by the Litigation Guardian (‘the applicant’) on behalf of an adult son (the ‘claimant’). The applicant alleges discrimination with respect to goods, services and facilities on the grounds of disability, contrary to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, (the “Code”). The applicant filed their complaint on August 11, 2023, and alleged that the last incident of discrimination occurred on August 19, 2022. The Tribunal evaluated whether jurisdictional concerns regarding the Tribunal’s authority to handle complaints involving incidents starting a year earlier should be approved.
An employee at Special Olympics informed the claimant that Team Ontario had the opportunity to bring two additional special athletes to the Canadian Olympic Games. The claimant reviewed the participant list and found that the top male and top female special athletes for all four races had participated at the World Games in Dubai in 2019. This caused concern as it became apparent that there were different participation rules for athletes with disabilities compared to non-disabled athletes. The claimant emailed an individual at Special Olympics Canada about their concerns regarding differential treatment, who explained that the “Special Olympics is not defined by the medals that are won at any level of competition, but rather by the fact that such an opportunity has been provided to these athletes.” Following this email correspondence, and in protest of the participation rule, the claimant emailed the Federal and Provincial Ministers of Sport and provided a copy of their protest letter to a Track Referee.
The Tribunal reasoned, as decided in, Mafinezam, that to be considered a part of a “series of incidents” within the meaning of section 34(1) of the Act, the event must be able to ‘stand on its own as an independent incident of discrimination.’ The single incident of alleged discrimination in the application at hand was when the claimant learned of the participation rule. For an act of discrimination to be considered a ‘series’ in law, the last alleged incident in the series must also be a Code breach. The applicant’s reactions to discriminatory conduct, such as email correspondence objecting to the participation rule, cannot be regarded as a separate violation of the Code.
The Tribunal found that described incidents could not be characterized as a series under law and the sole act of discrimination, is out of time by one day. The Tribunal then turned to the evaluation of whether the delay was in good faith. The claimant disputed that the delay was in good faith because they previously filed an application citing the same allegations with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) on June 9, 2023. However, the Tribunal found that because the applicant had not explained why they could not apply to the Tribunal between August 1, 2023, and August 10, 2023, it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the application, and therefore it was dismissed.
Alberta Human Rights Commission
Complainant v Suncor Energy Inc, 2024 AHRC 91 (CanLII)
Date Issued: June 14, 2024
In this case, the complainant alleged that the respondent discriminated against her on the grounds of gender and mental disability in respect to employment, contrary to s.7(1) of the Alberta Human Rights Act (“Act”). The complainant initially went on maternity leave and upon her return, was promoted to the role of Planner, after which she went on short-term disability leave. After returning from her leave, she went on a second maternity leave and after its completion, took further time off due to her mental disability. During the time the complainant was off work due to her mental disability, she worked with medical professionals and developed a return-to-work plan. The respondent provided a different work plan than the one suggested by the complainant’s medical team. Approximately two weeks after, the respondent informed the complainant that there was no position for her to return to and she was terminated from employment and disability benefits.
The testimonies that were provided by both parties’ conflict with one another. The Tribunal found that the complainant was credible and reliable in her testimony as it was consistent and corroborated with available evidence. The respondent agreed that the termination occurred and had adverse impacts, however, the respondent argued that the employment was terminated due to the restructuring of the company. An email surfaced in evidence from when the complainant was on leave, demonstrating intent to terminate as the employer redistributed her workload to others. Additionally, the respondent claims that they were unaware of the complainant’s pregnancy when deciding to terminate her employment. Further, the respondent believes that the complaint should be dismissed as the complainant was hesitant to return to work in Alberta due to her move to Newfoundland and the difficulty in traveling for the 4-3-day schedule.
The Tribunal recognized that other employees were not terminated during the restructuring of the company. Not only that, but the Tribunal gave weight to the fact that the respondent redacted the portion of the email displaying intent to terminate the complainant when sending her a copy. The respondent’s credibility was also called into question as the respondent had collaborated with the complainant to help maintain her disability benefits upon return, even though the decision to terminate her was already made.
As for discrimination on the grounds of gender, there was no evidence showing that the complainant informed the business unit or the HR department of the respondent’s pregnancy prior to the termination date. The respondent may have actually been unaware of her pregnancy, meaning that the pregnancy did not play a factor in the decision to terminate her.
When accommodating the complainant, the employer did not need to rehire her for the same position, and the respondent did not argue that there was any undue hardship in accommodating the complainant. The respondent had already decided that there was no work for the complainant to return to, and the plan to terminate was already in motion, as identified by the email. The respondent demonstrated a willingness to engage in accommodation as they sent a return-to-work schedule of their own even when knowing that they would be terminating her employment.
The Tribunal ultimately decided that discrimination had occurred on the grounds of disability as the respondent failed to accommodate the complainant’s return to work plan and came to the conclusion to terminate her employment well in advance. Thus, under s.32(b) of the Act, the complainant is entitled to a remedy including the sum of $40,000 as general damages for injury to dignity and self-respect, the total of $39,593 as 50% of the annual base salary of the complainant, 50% of the annual bonus, 50% of what would have been contributed to the complainant’s pension, the amount of $579.06 for the out-of-pocket expenses due to the termination of benefits, and any interest pursuant to the Judgement Interest Act.
Complainant v Secure Protection Service Inc, 2024 AHRC 92 (CanLII)
Date Issued: June 17, 2024
The complaint argues that the respondent discriminated against him on the grounds of physical disability in respect to employment, contrary to s.7 of the Human Rights Act due to being provided fewer shift opportunities. The complainant is a security guard who worked 12-hour shifts from Monday to Friday with some additional shifts due to which he asserts that he was a full-time employee. As a result of an assault, the complainant took medical leave and then was later involved in a car accident, which extended his absence from work, with the approval of the respondent.
Once the complainant returned to work, the respondent asked for medical verification to confirm his ability to return to work, and upon receipt, he was given two shifts. The complainant argues that he was discriminated against as he did not receive full-time hours. The complainant requested a record of employment and began searching for other work. Although the Tribunal found that the complainant was indeed on leave due to disability, it did not follow that the respondent’s request for medical verification adversely impacted the complainant, as he had been on leave for over six months and it was within the respondent’s rights to ask for medical documentation. The Tribunal found that the letter the complainant relied upon to confirm his full-time hours was unreliable and found that the hours the complainant worked constantly fluctuated between 7 to 89.5 hours, demonstrating inconsistency and not full-time status.
When the complainant was set to return to work after a three-month leave, the respondent attempted to contact the complainant each week after that period, but received no response. When the complainant returned to work, the respondent gave him the only two shifts that were available at that moment, and by the time more shifts became available, the complainant had already quit.
The Tribunal decided that since there was no case of discrimination, the respondent’s duty to accommodate or a remedy would not need to be considered.
Northwest Territories Human Rights Adjudication Panel
Complainant v. Inuvik Regional Hospital (Government of the Northwest Territories), 2024 CanLII 54015 (NT HRAP)
Date Issued: June 13, 2024
The application brought by the complainant alleged a breach of s.7(1) of the Human Rights Act, S.N.W.T 2002, c.18 (the “Act”) by the complainant’s previous employer, the Inuvik Regional Hospital. In 2017, the complainant submits that his health began to deteriorate and as a result, he was admitted into the Hospital. Due to his disability, the applicant took a leave of absence from work, during and after which he claims to have experienced heightened harassment from his employer, violating s.14 of the Act. The applicant was removed from the schedule and lab door codes were changed without his knowledge. The applicant also claims he received unwarranted criticism from his employer, and that the respondent violated the confidentiality of his medical information. The respondent disputes these allegations and maintains that all reasonable steps to provide accommodations in a timely manner, and to guarantee a safe return to the workplace were performed.
Evidence presented by the respondent, including testimony from the Regional Manager and Physician, indicated that the complainant was in a manic state and later diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2017. The Duty to Accommodate Advisor testified that the staff collaborated to complete the initial return-to-work form, considering the complainant’s need for time off. After his discharge, a return-to-work form was completed as requested by the employer, which the complainant felt did not accurately reflect his capabilities. The complainant requested a new form asserting that he was capable of working full-time hours. The form guided the physician to provide information about the complainant’s medical condition that he would not otherwise have provided. As a result, the respondent obtained information that it was not entitled to, and the breach of this sensitive, confidential information had an impact on the complainant’s ability to function in the workplace. The supervisor testified that the change in the door code was routine to ensure entry to the lab for only authorized workers and that the complainant was added to the schedule as instructed by a regional manager once they returned to work.
The Tribunal found that the complainant made a prima facie case of adverse discrimination, triggering the duty to accommodate. The obligation to take the necessary steps to determine what kinds of modifications might be required to allow the employee to participate fully in the workplace rests on the employer. Both parties have the duty to co-operate in the accommodation process to facilitate the search for a reasonable accommodation. The Tribunal determined that the respondent’s actions in facilitating the complainant’s transition into the workplace were necessary, and complied with medical advice from physicians and the employer’s health and safety obligations.
The Tribunal decided that the application should be granted in part. The respondent’s breach of s.7(1) of the Act was limited to the amendments to the first return-to work form allowing the respondent to seek and obtain sensitive medical information. However, the applicant’s return to work was not delayed for discriminatory reasons, and consequently the Tribunal did not make an order for lost income or expenses incurred under s.62(3). However, the Tribunal did award compensation for injury to the complainant’s dignity, feelings, and self-respect in the amount of $5000.
Law, Disability & Social Change 